Specific Generics

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References

The original plan was to talk about existence presuppositions of various sorts of NPs. In the end, what emerged was an extended commentary on recent research by Cleo Condoravdi and Veneeta Dayal. It is unclear to me what will happen to this work in the future. For comments, I thank the participants of an MIT semantics seminar, especially Danny Fox, Irene Heim, Orin Percus, Uli Sauerland, and Dag Wold.

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1. CONDORAVDI'S BARE PLURALS

Condoravdi's recent dissertation (1994) presents some unexpected bare plural uses:[1]

(1) a. In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
     b. Students were aware of this fact.

No mere existential force, near synonyms:

(2) a. The students were aware of this fact.
     b. Every student was aware of this fact.

Also available with stage-level predicates:

(3) Although the odds still seem to favor Senate approval of Thomas, opponents redoubled their effort and tried to delay a floor vote on confirmation … Proponents, in contrast, demanded a vote next week. (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 9/28/91)

Some more examples:

(4) The fundraising dinner was a success.
     Attending celebrities pledged their support for the candidate.

     The teacher strike upset the suburban calm of Newton.
     Parents wanted their children back in school.

     The train disaster made people think twice about traveling by train.

Differences from run-of-the-mill generics:

(i) they behave differently with respect to contextual restrictions,

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[1]Condoravdi cites passages in Lahiri's dissertation (1991) and in a paper by Prince (1992) as the only places where such uses had previously been noticed, without any thorough discussion however. Let me add that unexpected universal readings of bare plurals are also mentioned in some other contexts:

(A) Irene Heim and Larry Horn (mostly informal exchanges) have noticed that NPIs are licensed inside NPs consisting of *only* and a bare plural only if there is a generic/non-accidental reading:

(i) a. Only students who have any siblings need to complete the survey.
     b. #Only students who have any siblings happen to have passed the test.

(ii) Last night, we only ate dishes that had any garlic in them.

It is entirely unexpected that NPIs should be licensed in the focus of *only* since that is an upward entailing context (corresponding to the scope of *all*). Hence, the idea is that in these cases, it is a covert generic operator that licenses the NPI. Then, (ii) has to be a generic statement, which seems right, since it appears to state our culinary policy for the evening. On the interaction of *only* with quantifiers, see von Fintel (1996b).

(B) Counter-examples to Diesing's mapping hypothesis also often have the flavor of Condoravdi's bare plurals. Kiss (1994) and McNally (1995) have examples like:

(iii) a. Dinner plates were filthy.
       b. Committee members were bored.
       c. Graduate students were sleepy at the meeting.
       d. Rooms in the house were cold.

McNally writes that "these sentences … express generalizations over the denotations of their subjects in some temporally constrained domain". The crucial fact is that existential readings, expected with such stage-level predicates under Carlson/Diesing-type approaches, seem all but unavailable.

(ii) they carry existence presuppositions,

(iii) and they occur in contexts where singular indefinites cannot be read generically.

Contextual restrictions:

(1)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
         b.   Students were aware of this fact.

(5)   Students on the campus were aware of this fact.

(6)   a.   The Boston area has many universities.
         b.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the MIT campus.
         c.   Students were aware of this fact.

(7)   In general, students were aware of this fact. For some reason, however, MIT students
         had no idea of what was happening.

(8)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
         b.   There were 500 students in the Barton dormitory.
         c.   Students were aware of the danger.

Bona fide generic NPs do not accept implicit contextual restrictions[2]:

(9)   a.   There are lions and tigers in this cage.
         b.   Every lion has a mane.
         c.   Lions have a mane.

(10)   (Context: we are near a cage with lions and tigers)

         a.   Look! Every lion has a mane.
         b.   Look! Lions have a mane.

Condoravdi uses these facts to argue that these bare plurals cannot be generics and develops her own account where she crucially makes them into NPs introducing a new but inferrable set of entities. Their universal force is derivative of the fact that they make reference to an inferred bridging function. Condoravdi argues that there is implicit universal quantification over such contextually supplied parameters (following some notions of Chierchia on the distinction between existential and universal readings of donkey pronouns).[3]

Next, Condoravdi shows that her bare plurals carry a presupposition of existence:[4]

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[2]Cf. Croft (1986) and Krifka (1987). Sometimes, Dahl (1975) is mentioned as having noticed this fact. But, Dahl's point was slightly different: he argued that generics are about more than just actual individuals, while other quantifiers can be understood to be restricted to actual individuals. His example was:

(i)   a.   A member of this club does not drink whisky.
         b.   The members of this club do not drink whisky.

In essence, this is just the difference between lawlike and accidental generalizations.

[3]I am very uncomfortable with these assumptions. For me, the most natural interpretation of a contextual parameter is deictic and not universally generalized.

[4](11d) is my example, to add to the cases where the existence presupposition projects all the way up.

(11)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
        b.   Students with police connections were aware of the danger.
        c.   Students with police connections were not aware of the danger.
        d.   If students with police connections were aware of the danger, there must have
              been leaks in the local police department.

All of the examples in (11b-d) convey that there were in fact students with police connections on the campus.

Condoravdi suggests that this behavior is unexpected from true generics. We have to note however that there are two kinds of generics with respect to existence presuppositions. Dahl distinguished between descriptive generics and normative generics. Normative generics talk about morally perfect worlds, and since the actual world is not necessarily morally perfect, such generics may be uninstantiated in the actual world. This is not so for descriptive generics. Carlson [in generics book] gives some examples of uninstantiated generics:

(12)   a.   The speaker of the House succeeds the Vice President.
        b.   This can opens at the top.
        c.   Mary handles all the mail from Antarctica.

Only such normative generic statements can be true without there ever being any actual instances. Hence, Condoravdi's bare plurals do not behave like these generics, but it is not so obvious that they differ from descriptive generics like *John walks to school*, which states a lawlike descriptive generalization and does seem to require instantiating cases (quite a few perhaps).

Lastly, Condoravdi shows that singular indefinites do not give rise to the special reading:

(13)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
        b.   A student was aware of this fact.

2. DAYAL'S *ANY*

Dayal's recent SALT 5 paper (1995) revolves around unexpected *any*-NPs:[5]

(14)   At the party, John talked to any woman who came up to him.

The *any*-NP in (14) is clearly not in the scope of negation and is thus not an occurrence of negative polarity *any*. On the other hand, there is apparently no modal or generic operator that would make the *any*-NP a run-of-the-mill occurrence of free choice *any*. Nevertheless, (14) seems to make a universal generalization about women that came up to John at the party. Here are further examples from Dayal's paper:

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[5]Dayal cites LeGrand (1975), as well as Davison (1980) and Carlson (1981). Again, no thorough discussion had appeared before Dayal.

(15) a. Any man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner.
      b. Any woman who heard the news contributed to the fund.
      c. The President thanked any soldier who had fought in the Gulf War.
      d. Anybody who attended last week's huge rally signed the petition.
      e. Anybody who is in Mary's semantics seminar is writing a paper on polarity items.
      f. Those days Bill offered Mary anything he cooked.
      g. John made a fool of himself in front of anyone who was there.
      h. Mary sang for anyone who wanted to hear her.
      i. John knew any language that we encountered on our trip.
      j. John liked anything that was placed before him.
      k. John read any book on giraffes he could find.
      l. John talked to any woman at the party.
      m. John talked to any politician who is powerful.
      n. You must pick any flower you see.
      o. Any student who studied for the exam must have got an A on the quiz.
      p. Anyone who is interested in the matter must sign this.

Dayal argues that these *any*-NPs cannot be treated as indefinites in the restriction of a modal operator, but that they are simply universal quantifiers. We can find at least three arguments against treating these NPs as generics:

   (i) the subtrigging requirement,

   (ii) the behavior with respect to contextual restrictions, and

   (iii) the fact that singular indefinites in these contexts cannot be read generically.

These *any*-NPs must be licensed by the presence of a relative clause, a phenomenon called *subtrigging* by LeGrand (1975).[6]

(16)   *John talked to any woman.
       *Any man didn't eat dinner.
       *Any woman contributed to the fund.

(17)   John talked to any woman who came up to him.
       Any man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner.
       Any woman who heard the news contributed to the fund.

Why are relative clauses necessary? According to Dayal's analysis, *any* is an item that can attach to existential or universal quantifiers. Its licensing conditions are:

   (i) *non-existence*
        an occurrence of [NP *any* β] in a statement φ is licit only if it does not entail ∃βφ;

   (ii) *contextual vagueness*,
        the speaker must not be able to identify the individual(s) who verify(ies) φ.

Dayal's idea is that the existence presupposition of universal quantifiers[7] properly only applies to the set picked out by the head noun, it does not extend to the set formed by intersecting the noun set with the relative clause set:

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[6]I have no idea what the term is supposed to mean.

(18)   a.   Mary read every book assigned last semester.
            Since there were no books assigned, she read nothing.

       b.   Mary read every book.
            Since there were no books, she read nothing.

Since under her analysis one of the licensing conditions of her analysis is *non-existence*, *any* can only attach to an NP that contains a relative clause.

Dayal's also observes that in subtrigged *any*-sentences, we only get an essential/non-accidental reading of the generalization. First, subtrigged *any* is not licensed in contexts where an accidental reading is favored:

(19)   #Any student (who is) in Mary's class happened to vote Republican.
       #Any woman standing under that tree is Mary's friend.

Furthermore, the relative clause cannot be substituted with extensionally equivalent restrictions:

(20)   Anybody who is in Mary's semantics seminar is writing a paper on polarity items.
       #Anybody who is in Mary's field methods course is writing a paper on polarity items.

Dayal points out that subtrigged *any* cannot be contextually restricted to apply only to some set of relevant entities (this is covered by her analysis under the contextual vagueness stipulation).

(21)   a.   There were $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{several}\\ 20\end{matrix}\right\}$ students at the lecture.

       b. $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{Every}\\ \text{* Any}\end{matrix}\right\}$ student who was there said it was inspiring.[8]

Dayal argues that subtrigged FC *any* can't be a generic indefinite because it occurs in environments where generic indefinites do not occur:[9]

(22)   a.   John talked to a woman who came up to him.
       b.   A man who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner.
       c.   A woman who heard the news contributed to the fund.

Note though that generic bare plurals <u>are</u> OK:

(23)   a.   John talked to women who came up to him.
       b.   Men who saw the fly in the food didn't eat dinner.
       c.   Women who heard the news contributed to the fund.

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[7]That natural language quantifiers have an existence presupposition was first argued by Strawson (1950, 1952). Strawson claims to be reconstructing Aristotle's logic. As shown by Horn (1989: Section 1.1.3 "Existential Import and the Square of Opposition"), however, this is historically inaccurate. There may have been precedents before Strawson, but the history is as yet unclear to me (one suspicion I have concerns Mill).

[8]In a seminar discussion at MIT, a counter-example was discovered:

   (i)   Only about 20 students attended the lecture, but any student who <u>was</u> there said it was inspiring.

[9]Dayal also gives examples with singular *some*-indefinites. Those, however, are irrelevant because such indefinites never give rise to run-of-the-mill generic readings. A mystery of its own, by the way.

This is where the plot thickens: the examples in (23) look suspiciously like Condoravdi-type examples. Perhaps, Condoravdi and Dayal have discovered two aspects of the same phenomenon? This suspicion gets reinforced when we notice that Condoravdi's bare plurals apparently license *any*:

(24)   Students with any connection to the local police were aware of the danger.

Note that this is presumably unexpected under Condoravdi's own analysis (where the universal force of these NPs is derived indirectly and hence would probably not license NPIs).

3. RE-EXAMINATION

Things to look at:

(i) existence presuppositions,

(ii) lawlikeness (non-accidental reading, counterfactual entailment),

(iii) contextual restrictions.

Existence presupposition seems to arise with Dayal's *any* as well:

(25)   At the party last night, John talked to any woman that came up to him.

(26)   At the party last night, John talked to $\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{any student at the party}\\\text{any student who was at the party}\\\text{any student who was there}\\\text{anyone at the party who was a student}\\\text{anyone there who was a student}\end{array}\right\}$.

(27)   John probably talked to any supporter who came up to him, since we received no complaints afterwards.

Lawlikeness:

Dayal clearly shows that subtrigged *any* expresses a non-accidental generalization. We can further support this observation by noting that statements with subtrigged *any* support counterfactual inferences. Suppose it is true that John talked to any woman who came up to him. We can infer that if Mary (who did not in fact come up to him) had come up to him, he would have talked to her. This property of non-accidental generalizations was noted by Goodman in a classic paper (1947), see also Kratzer's *Lumps of Thought* paper (1989).

Dayal cites David Dowty and Dick Oehrle as having pointed out to her that "the net effect is that the statement seems to be more about John's disposition rather than about John's actual behavior". Crucially, however, she cannot make use of that fact, let alone account for it, in her semantic analysis since she assumes that there is no modal operator binding the *any*-NP in these cases.

(28)   a.   Last semester, the workload was tremendous.
       b.   Students in Mary's semantics seminar wrote a paper on polarity items.
       c.   #Students in Mary's field methods course wrote a paper on polarity items.

(1)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
       b.   Students were aware of this fact.

(29)   a.   Every coin in my pocket is silver.
       b.   #Coins in my pocket are silver.

(30)   a.   Yesterday was a strange day for me.
        b.   Coins in my pocket were silver.

Both of our new kinds of NPs then lead to lawlike generalizations. Why not attribute this fact to the presence of an implicit operator that talks about laws? Why not say that these <u>are</u> generic statements? We would have to deal with the tension between the existence implication and the intensional nature of lawlike generalizations. Dayal saw lawlikeness and non-existence, Condoravdi saw existence and pure accidence. How is it possible that they are talking about the same thing?

<u>Contextual restriction</u>:

(8)   a.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
        b.   There were 500 students in the Barton dormitory.
        c.   Students were aware of the danger.

(21)   a.   There were 20 students at the lecture.
        b.   #Any student who was there said it was inspiring.

(31)   a.   There were numerous people who came up to John at the fund-raiser.
        b.   #He talked to any woman.

        c.   In 1985 there was a ghost haunting the campus.
        d.   Any student was aware of the danger.

One difference between the two kinds of NPs concerns their ability to occur in object position. When I take Dayal's sentences and attempt to substitute bare plurals for the *any*-NP, the new sentence seems to work if and only if the NP is in subject position:

(32)   a.   Any woman who heard the news contributed to the fund.
              Women who heard the news contributed to the fund.

        b.   Anybody who attended last week's huge rally signed the petition.
              People who attended last week's huge rally signed the petition.

        c.   The President thanked any soldier who had fought in the Gulf War.
              !The President thanked soldiers who had fought in the Gulf War.

        d.   Those days Bill offered Mary anything he cooked.
              !Those days Bill offered Mary things he cooked.

        e.   John knew any language that we encountered on our trip.
              !John knew languages that we encountered on our trip.

        f.   John liked anything that was placed before him.
              !John liked things that were placed before him.

        g.   John read any book on giraffes he could find.
              #!John read books on giraffes he could find.

4. AN ANALYSIS

4.1 A Theory of Genericity

I treat generic sentences as involving an implicit quantifier over situations, not unlike the overt quantifiers over situations known as adverbs of quantification. For some discussion, see other work I have done on these topics (von Fintel 1995a, 1996a).[10]

The general logical form for generic sentences looks like this:

(33) $\lambda^s \, \forall_s \left(C_{s,g} \right) (\varphi)$

- I believe that the reasons usually adduced to show that the generic quantifier is not a universal quantifier are spurious. This is the topic of another paper (von Fintel 1996a).
- The quantifier claims that the subset relation holds between two sets of situations.
- The first set of situations can be restricted explicitly by an *if*-clause (a so-called conditional construction), or implicitly by a variety of signals (topic/focus-articulation, presuppositions, syntactic markings such as scrambling, etc.).
- The second set of situations is simply given by the sentence that the generic quantifier attaches to.
- Since the domain of situations is structured by a part-whole relation, there are issues about how to prevent counting overlapping situations. The simplest trick is to demand that the situations in the restriction are disjoint. Minimal situations are the most popular solution, for problems see von Fintel (1995a), Dekker (1995), and von Fintel (1995b).
- In (33), there is a free variable C that denotes the contextual restriction. It is thought of as a function from the evaluation situation and an ordering source to a set of situations (roughly speaking it gives the currently relevant situations, a kind of accessibility function or modal base function).
- Different flavors of quantification over situations can be obtained by manipulating the C-function.
- As all quantifiers, the generic quantifier presupposes that it is supplied with a non-empty domain. The force of this presupposition is however tempered by the fact that the generic quantifier does not require that all of the situations in its restriction be actual situations. Hence, the existence presupposition is rather harmless.

(34)   a.   Dinosaurs ate kelp.

       b. $\lambda^s \, \forall_s \left(C_{s,g} \right) \left(\lambda^{s'} \left(\text{dinosaurs}_T \; \text{ate}_{s'} \; \text{kelp} \right) \right)$

- Let us assume that (34a) is meant as a generic claim about dinosaurs rather than as one about kelp.[11] Let us also assume that this is signalled somehow. Here I have T-marked (T for *topic*) the subject NP. The bare plural is interpreted as an existential quantifier.

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[10]See also Krifka et.al. (1995), which is the best survey of the study of generics.

[11]That there is an ambiguity (in fact more than two readings) is well-known. Recall Chomsky's classic examples of the beavers who build dams and the dams that are built by beavers.

The topic-marking will trigger a presupposition that s' is a situation that contains a dinosaur. This presupposition then projects straightforwardly, so that it is presupposed that every situation in C is a dinosaur situation.

- Since the sentence hardly claims that dinosaurs were constantly eating kelp, there are further tacit restrictions, perhaps that only situations are considered where a dinosaur is in a position to eat kelp.[12]
- The past tense projects a presupposition that all of the relevant situations are situated before the evaluation situation, which results in an inference that dinosaurs are extinct.[13]
- The sentence then claims that all of the relevant past dinosaur-in-a-position-to-eat-kelp situations are situations in which dinosaurs ate kelp. In other words, any relevant dinosaur in a position to eat kelp did so.
- Why is there a counterfactual entailment? The set contains non-actual situations as long as they are close enough as measured by the ordering source parameter. The entailment then holds for any situation in the set.
- Why does there seem to be an existence presupposition about actual dinosaurs? This must be quite roundabout. The indefinite NP *dinosaurs* itself does not carry an existence presupposition, which is however triggered by the topic-marking. But then the existence presupposition is quickly gobbled up again by the quantifier over situations, leading to the presupposition that we are talking about situations in which there exist dinosaurs. But since the quantifier does not care whether its argument situations are actual ones, we don't get an existence presupposition about actual dinosaurs. The idea is rather that we could not possibly believe (34a) if we didn't believe that there were dinosaurs. This generic statement is a descriptive generalization, not a normative statement. Other generics are different, especially those that involve a policy.

4.2 Specific Generics

(35)   a.   Vegetarian dinosaurs ate kelp.
        b.   Dinosaurs ate kelp unless they were carnivores.

(36)   In the late Jurassic, dinosaurs ate kelp.

(37)   a.   When I went to Jurassic Park, I observed the late evening feeding at the beach. Many animals were to be seen.

        b.   Dinosaurs ate kelp. Mammals feasted on mussels.

        c.   Any dinosaurs I saw ate kelp.

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[12]For discussion of ambiguities with respect to this point, cf. Dahl's example of what it means to ask whether John eats artichokes.

[13]The inference depends on the assumption that the culinary dispositions of dinosaurs are not likely to have changed at any point. For thorough discussion of such lifetime inferences, see Musan (1995).

4.3 Properties of Specific Generics

<u>Lawlikeness</u>

Generics involve quantification over a set of situations that is constrained to contain all relevant possible situations that are normal to a certain degree. This directly means that they will support counterfactuals, as long as those move within the same contextual confines.

<u>Existence</u>

(33) $\lambda^s \, \forall_s \, (C_{s,g}) \, (\varphi)$

Indefinites in the scope ϕ can carry topic-marking, which results in an existence presupposition. This presupposition is projected so that it is presupposed that every situation in C supports the existence of an element in the extension of the indefinite. However, since the domain is not restricted to just actual situations, we do not straightforwardly project an existence presupposition wrt to the actual world. This is the way Kratzer has argued we should deal with examples like

(38)   All trespassers will be prosecuted.

Strawson argued that all quantifiers carry existence presuppositions, but (38) is a counter-example since it doesn't presuppose that there are trespassers. If there is deontic modality involved, however, Kratzer showed, the presupposition will project harmlessly. It is just that (38) only makes a demand for those possible worlds where there are trespassers, without prejudice as to whether the actual worlds is one of those.

Above we observed that our specific generics do carry actual world existence presuppositions. How come? Again, it must be an indirect effect, perhaps coming from assertability constraints.

Are there specific generics without actual world presuppositions?

(39)   At the party tonight, John plans talk to any woman that comes up to him.

<u>Contextual Restrictions</u>

Generics are quantifiers over a contextually restricted set of situations. Hence, like all quantifiers they admit and encourage contextual restrictions.

(40)   a.   Animals have a variety of defense strategies. Baboons form a protective circle.
         b.   Cats land on their feet.

(9)   a.   There are lions and tigers in this cage.
         b.   Every lion has a mane.
         c.   Lions have a mane.

The fact in (9) is more or less expected. The topical indefinites that indirectly restrict generics are not NPs with their own contextual restriction. So, in the Croft/Krifka example in (9), the indefinite *lions* itself cannot be contextually restricted to the set of

lions introduced. Furthermore, there is no set of situations salient that would contextually restrict the generic quantifier. Hence, (9c) has no contextually restricted reading here.

(41) a. The fundraising dinner was a success.
      b. Any woman who had heard the candidate contributed to the campaign.
      c. Women who had heard the candidate contributed to the campaign.

(42) a. Serengeti is a magical place for big game animals.
      b. Lions have the freedom to roam over a large territory.

Explicit Operators

(47) John usually talks to any woman that comes up to him.

(48) As a rule, John talked to any woman that came up to him at the party last night.

So far so good. We now turn to some recalcitrant facts. Let me start by reminding you why these specific generics are so remarkable. They are generic statements about very particular, localized situations. The sentences and their contexts contain many clues that a specific episode is being talked about. Nevertheless, we can read these sentences as generic statements. Perhaps, we would expect that there is somewhat of a tension between clues here. Perhaps, we would expect that we need be told quite explicitly that a generic statement is being made. My intuition was that perhaps some of the properties of Condoravdi's and Dayal's examples can be explained by this need for preventing a semantic garden path. But, I doubt that this can be made into a satisfactory account.

Subtrigging

I have no clue why Dayal's *any* needs to have a relative clause. I accept the basic idea of Kadmon & Landman, that free choice *any* is simply an indefinite in a generic context. In the absence of a negative licenser, the presence of *any* alone should reliably signal that a generic/modal statement is being made.[14] So, why require a relative clause?

Would it help to look at other cases where a relative clause is obligatory? Here's one:

(43) The few people *(who were there) actually liked the lecture.

Here's another. Carlson (1981) notes that *someone* can have a generic/universal reading only if there is a relative clause:

(44) a. Someone who hates mushrooms also hates toadstools.
      b. John likes someone who takes his time.
      c. Someone who is strong can tear doors off their hinges.

Maybe the RC strengthens the FC interpretation by drawing attention to it. FC is often signalled by RCs that mean indifference etc. The RCs are often rather empty.

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[14]Ahem, I actually have a problem here. My general doctrine is that there is no sense in which the indefinites that intuitively help to restrict a quantifier over situations is actually "mapped" into the restriction at any syntactic level. But, I did want to stick to the idea that *any* signals that its NP is in a downward monotone context. I will have to do some pretty fancy footwork here.

Could it be that the relative clause is needed to provide a plausible restriction for the generic quantifier? Otherwise, we'd be making the claim that generically any woman had the property of being talked to by John at the party last night. But why shouldn't we get the same effect by contextual restriction?

(45)   How did John behave at the party when people came up to him?
        ??He talked to any woman, but still refused to acknowledge men.

<u>Other Indefinites</u>

Other indefinites: why do singular indefinites not show up as specific generics? Could it be just an effect of having to mark the generic reading in the face of all the stuff that's pulling towards a purely accidental statement of episodic fact?

Note that anyone needs to explain why in certain cases singular unmarked indefinites cannot be read generically. Also:

(46)   a.   I hate Bellini operas.
        b.   I hate a Bellini opera.

5. CONCLUSION AND SPECULATIONS

This paper is in the spirit of Kratzer's work (1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1991), stressing that apparent ambiguities can be seen as involving differences in how contextual parameters are filled.

Worrying issues:

- status of constructions?

- lots of issues of compositionality

>   (i) implicit operators: really, distribution of clues all over the structure

>   (ii) *almost*

>   (iii) pseudo-scope for universals in generic contexts (Fox and Sauerland 1995)

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