

US MILITARY POWER
17.482-3

Professor Barry R. Posen

Tuesdays, 1.00pm-3.00 pm

Room E25-117

Discussion sections: TBA

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Overview

The purpose of this course is to acquaint the student with the missions, capabilities, and costs of the largely non-nuclear forces that make up the bulk of the US military establishment. The course will also introduce the student to basic techniques for the assessment of relative military capabilities between adversaries in given theaters of military action. Central to the course will be an examination of historical cases of military action that shed light on current defense issues. Many of these cases are recent.

Students will be evaluated on the basis of one paper (50%) a mid-term (15%) a final exam (25%). The paper will consist of an analysis of a current conventional forces problem. The paper will be due at the beginning of class, one week before the last day of class. Late paper policy: Extensions will only be granted in the event of documented medical or personal emergencies. Late papers will be penalized one third a grade per day late (e.g., A to A-). This means that you should begin working on the paper at the beginning of the semester. Some eligible topics are listed at the end of this syllabus. There will be an undergraduate discussion section (10%). There will be a graduate discussion section. Attendance for the discussion section and lectures is mandatory.

The mid-term is an open-note, sit-down, one hour in-class exam. The final exam is an open note, sit-down exam during the examination period. Study questions will be distributed before the final exam. These questions will be closely related but not identical to those asked on the actual exam. The TA will conduct a review session before the exam, during the final class meeting. The purpose of the exercise is to encourage one last overall review of the main points of the semester. Though the structure appears friendly, it is not a piece of cake.

Required readings will be available through the Stellar web site for this class.

<http://stellar.mit.edu/S/course/17/sp09/17.482/>

Topic List

February 3	Introduction: The Past, Present and Future of the U.S. Force Structure
February 10	U.S. Grand Strategy
February 17	No Class - Monday class schedule to compensate for President's Day
February 24	The Fundamentals of Campaign Analysis
March 3	History and Role of Airpower
March 10	The last fair fight?: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944
March 17	Mid-Term Intelligence and Military Operations
March 24	No Class - Spring break
March 31	Naval Power and Power Projection
April 7	The New U.S. Way of War: Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom
April 14	Counter-Insurgency & Iraq: An Old Problem Returns
April 21	No Class -Patriot's Day
April 28	"Humanitarian Military Intervention" The War for Kosovo
May 5	The Nuclear Age, Nuclear Proliferation, and the Global War on Terror
May 12	Review Session

Week 1, February 3 - Introduction: The Past, Present and Future of the U.S. Force Structure

Please do not be alarmed at the aridity and opacity of the readings for this week. They are background materials that simply summarize the composition and costs of the non-nuclear forces of the U.S. at this moment.

“Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2009,” January 2009

Available at: <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9953/01-06-DefensePlans.pdf>

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006: pages 1-8, 19-20, 41-62.

Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/>

Annual Defense Department Report, 2005, p.i-iii, and Appendices A,B,C

http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html

Global Trends 2025, pp. iv-xiii, November 2008,

http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/3/Global-Trends-2025.pdf

Consult Association of the US Army (AUSA), “Fiscal Year 2009 Army Budget: An Analysis,” 2008: skim pp. 1-65, focus on pp. 65-107.

Reference Note: Students should get to know both the Pentagon and Congressional Budget Office websites. Both are important sources of information for this course.

Week 2, February 10 - US Grand Strategy

Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 5-53.

Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 39-55.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006

Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>

The National Military Strategy of the U.S.A., 2004, pp. 1-38

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>

[Students may also be interested in *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, June 2008, available at:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf>]

Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007

Skim President Barack Obama, Various Documents on Foreign and Defense Affairs, http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/>
http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/foreign_policy/ and
<http://www.barackobama.com/issues/defense/> See in particular:
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/foreign_policy/Fact_Sheet_21st_Century_Threats.pdf
http://www.barackobama.com/2007/10/02/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_27.php
http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/Fact_Sheet_Defense_FINAL.pdf

http://obama.3cdn.net/417b7e6036dd852384_luzxmv109.pdf

Barry R. Posen, “Stability and Change in US Grand Strategy,” *Orbis*, Vol. 51, no. 4 (October 2007), pp. 561-567

Recommended:

Barry R. Posen, “A Grand Strategy of Restraint,” Center for a New American Security, June 2008
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI071508/Posen2_Testimony071508.pdf

Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991), 5-53.

Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press and Harvey Sapolsky, “Come Home America” *International Security*, Vol. 21, no. 4 (1997), pp. 5-48

John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford UP, 1982), Chapter 2

Week 3, February 17 – No class (Monday class schedule)

Week 4, February 24 - The Fundamentals of Campaign Analysis

[For very basic background and definitions of some military terms with which you may be unfamiliar, see James F. Dunnigan, *How to Make War: a Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the 21st Century*, 2003. On reserve at Dewey library]

John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982) pp.139-175.

Barry R. Posen, "The Balance of Ground Forces on the Central Front," Chapter 3, from *Inadvertent Escalation*, pp. 68-128.

For a critique of this literature students should read Eliot Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988) pp. 176-215.

For responses to this critique, and Cohen's defense, you may wish to review the "Correspondence" in *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Spring 1989).

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*, (Princeton University Press, 2004) chapter 3, pp. 28-51.

Reference Note: TRADOC: OPFOR Worldwide Equipment Guide, 2001 is a U.S. Army guide to many kinds of weapons and other equipment that could turn up in the hands of potential adversaries.

<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/weg2001.pdf>

Recommended:

Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending S. Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," 22/4 *International Security*, (Spring 1998) pp. 135-170.

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law," *International Security*, Summer, 1987, pp. 135-139.

John W. R. Lepingwell, "The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined," *International Security*, Summer, 1987, pp. 89-127.

Students interested in an alternative model may wish to consult Joshua Epstein, *Strategy and Force Planning*, (Brookings Institution: 1987)

Week 5, March 3 - The History and Role of Airpower

W.A. Jacobs, "The Battle for France, 1944," from *Close Air Support*, Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Editor, Washington, DC: US Air Force (US Government Printing Office) 1990, pp. 237-293.

Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," *International Security*, Fall, 1990.

E. Cohen and T. Keaney, Chapter 3, "What did the Air Campaign Accomplish?," (*GWAPS*) pp. 55-119.

Daryl Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44.

Thomas A. Keaney, "The Linkage of Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 147-150.

Richard Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas Griffith, Jr., "Winning with Allies: the Strategic Value of the Afghan Model," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005-6), pp. 124-160.

Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: the Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Winter 2005-6), pp. 161-176.

Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 7-33.

For a sample air campaign done by professionals in the business, see Wendell Minnick, “RAND Study Suggests US Loses War with China,” DefenseNews.com, 16 October 2008, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3774348> and John Stillion and Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present, and Future,” August 2008, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf.

For the use of airpower by non-great powers, students may also want to look at Ronald E. Bergquist, *The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War* (Air Force University Press, 1988), especially pp. ix-x, 49-82

Students interested in ballistic missiles should consult the following for a very preliminary introduction to the issues involved:

George N. Lewis, Steve Fetter, and Lisbeth Gronlund, “Casualties and Damage from SCUD Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War,” MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, March 1993

Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report* (Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 82-89, online at http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/gulf_war_air_power_survey-summary.pdf

Joseph Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasion Paper No. 2, 1999, online at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/index.htm>

Week 6 - March 10 - The Last Fair Fight?: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944

Background: Russell Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 1-31 and The Division—Combat organizations in World War II. (US Government charts)

Hugh Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, (Washington DC: US Army, 1994) pp. 52, 649-660, 685-686.

Charles B. MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, Chapters 6,12,13,14, p. 629

Recommended:

Charles MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets* (NY: William Morrow, 1985) is recommended in its entirety for those interested in ground warfare when it does not go entirely right. Alternatively, students may wish to review Trevor Dupuy, *Hitler's Last Gamble. The Battle of the Bulge*, (NY: HarperCollins, 1996).

*****Week 7, March 17 - Mid-Term; Intelligence and Military Operations*****

Background (Skim the following 3 works):

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, April 2005, "Appendix C: An Intelligence Community Primer," available online at: <http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html>

Steve Daggett, "Overview of the Intelligence Budget," Congressional Research Service, September 24, 2004.

Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkom, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report RL31872, pp. 1-19, skim 19-48, available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31872.pdf>

Required:

Richard Russell, "Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the Military" *SAIS Review*, Vol 24, No. 2 (2002), pp. 1-18.

Thomas Mahnken, "War in the Information Age" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1995-1996).

Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, "Network-Enabled Battle Command," *Military Review*, May-June 2005, pp. 1-5.

Richard Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics* 31.1 (Oct. 1978): 61-89.

Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 2006)

Uri Bar Joseph, "Israel's 1973 Intelligence Failure," *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 6, no. 1, **read** pp. 11-22, **skim and consider merits of competing explanations** pp. 22-32.

Uri Bar Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), pp. 201-234.

Recommended:

Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996.

Week 8, March 24 – no class - Spring Break

Week 9, March 31 – Naval Power and Power Projection

Required Background:

“The Future of the Navy’s Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Forces,” Congressional Budget Office, November 2004. Please read Chapter 1, “Introduction” (pages 1-14) and page 25. Students contemplating Navy or Amphib. Papers should review the entire document.

“Options for the Navy’s Future Fleet,” CBO study, May 2006.

<http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7232/05-31-Navy.pdf>

Required:

Strategy:

Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.

Naval Operations: The Nexus of Air and Surface Warfare

NOTE: useful references for the Falklands Campaign are available via Gordon Smith, *Battle Atlas of the Falkland War*, online at <http://www.naval-history.net/NAVAL1982FALKLANDS.htm>. See in particular Chapter 8 (“British Task-Force Buildup”), 9 (“Royal Navy Warships”) and 24 “ARA General Belgrano Sunk”).

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands* (New York: Norton, 1983), **read** pp. 82-84 **before** the Woodward piece and 150-157 **after** Woodward.

Admiral (retired) Sandy Woodward, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (London: Harper-Collins, 1991), pp. 1-22, 146-164.

Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," *International Security*, Vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 82-117.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW):

George Lindsey, “Tactical Anti-Submarine Warfare: The Past and Future,” *Adelphi Paper*, Vol. 16, no. 122 (Spring 1976), pp. 30-39

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortune: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, “Chapter 2: Failure to Learn: American Antisubmarine Warfare in 1942,” (New York: Free Press, 1990), pp. 59-94

Barry Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation*, “Chapter 5: Sea Control,” (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), pp. 159-196

Raids Ashore:

Peter Krause, “The Last Good Chance: A Reassessment of US Operations at Tora Bora,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 17, no 4 (Winter 2008), pp. 644-684

Recommended:

Skim Military Transformation: Fielding of Army’s Stryker Vehicles Is Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to Be Clarified, GAO-04-925, August 2004. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04925.pdf>

Week 10, April 7 – The New American Way of War?: Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom

Gulf War I

Skim Gen. Bernard Trainor (USMC, ret.) and Michael Gordon, The Generals’ War, chapters 18-20 for orientation on evolution of the conflict.

John Mueller, "The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War," *Security Studies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995) pp. 77-117.

Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996) pp. 139-179.

Daryl Press, “Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf”, *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 137-146.

Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs*, 75-2, March-April 1996, pp. 37-54.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000, pp. 11-22.

Review: Cohen/Keaney and Press readings from week 5 on airpower in Gulf War.

Gulf War II

Skim “On Point” – the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Chapters 3-6. Skim these pages to get a sense of how the campaign unfolded. Also review maps and other graphics in these sections.

Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: the View from the Inside,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2006.

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: the Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, chapters 13 (“Task Force Tarawa”) and 14 (“Vampire 12”).

Stephen Biddle, et al. “Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation,” US Army War College, April 2004, <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biddle.pdf>
Recommended:

John Gordon IV and Bruce Pirnie, “ ‘Everybody Wanted Tanks’: Heavy Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* No. 39 (2005)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1539.pdf

US Air Force, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers,” 30 April 2003,

Eliot Cohen, “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, no. 3 (September 2004), pp. 395-407.

Other Important Desert Storm Books:

Rick Atkinson, *Crusade*

E. Cohen and T. Keaney, *Gulf War Airpower Survey Summary Report (GWAPS)*

US News Staff, *Triumph Without Victory*,

Nicholas Reynolds, *Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004)

(These are moderately detailed overviews of the whole war; see also various participant memoirs.)

Week 11, April 14 – Iraq, Afghanistan & Counter-Insurgency: An Old Problem Returns

Theory

Austin Long, The Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (2006), Chapters 4 and 5, pp. 21-55.

James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 1995-96), pp. 59-69

IRAQ

The Evolution of the Insurgency in Iraq

Ahmed Hashem, “Iraq’s Chaos: Why the insurgency won’t go away,” *Boston Review*, (October/November 2004) <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/hashim.html>

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 2005, executive summary.

Barry Posen, “Exit Strategy: How to Disengage from Iraq in 18 months,” *Boston Review*, January/February 2006.

FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, December 2006: forward, preface, plus pages 1-24 to 1-29.

Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006
Urban Combat in Counter-Insurgency

Dexter Filkins, “In Falluja, Young Marines Saw the Savagery of an Urban War,” *New York Times*, November 21, 2004.

John C. Moore, “Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain,” *Armor*, November-December 2004, pp. 32-37.

2007-2008 Change of U.S. Strategy and Tactics and Political Change Within Iraq

Iraq Strategy Review Highlights, National Security Council, summary briefing slides, January 2007.

Fred Kagan, “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq, Phase 1 report,” January 4, 2007” pp. 3-40.

Thomas R. Searle, “Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 50, Summer 2008, pp. 62-66.

Gen. David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, September 10-11, 2007. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf>.

Charts to accompany the testimony of Gen. David H. Petraeus, September 10-11, 2007. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony-Slides20070910.pdf>.

Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008

AFGHANISTAN

Background and Evolution of Insurgency

Skim Seth Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (RAND, 2008), pp. 25-66, 87-110

Growing Problems and Calls for a Change in Strategy

David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” *New York Times*, 12 August 2007

Seth Jones, “Averting Failure in Afghanistan,” *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 111-123

Barnett Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2007

James Jones and Thomas Pickering, “Afghanistan Study Group Report,” 2nd edition, January 2008, available online at:
http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf

A Change in Strategy?

Karen DeYoung, “Obama Looks to Explore New Approach in Afghanistan War,” *Washington Post*, 11 November 2008, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/10/AR2008111002897.html>

Peter Beaumont and Gaby Hinsliff, “US to Send 30000 Extra Troops to Afghanistan,” *The Guardian*, 20 December 2008, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/20/us-afghanistan-troops-surge>

Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, “Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,” *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2009, available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587

Students interested in COIN are encouraged to review past operations. Some useful sources are:

Robert Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect* (RAND, February 1972), Report R-957-ARPA

Robert Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (RAND, February 1971), R-967-ARPA

Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)

[for situation of Krepinevich’s work in the broader literature on the Army in Vietnam, consult Ronald Spector, “Review: U.S. Army Strategy in the Vietnam War,” *International Security*, Vol. 11, no. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 130-134].

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, ed. Lester Grau (NDU Press, 1996)

Olga Oliker, *Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat*, “Chapter 2: Grozny I, 1994-1995”

Week 12, April 21 – No Class – Patriot’s Day Vacation

**Week 13, April 28 – "Humanitarian Military Intervention":
The War for Kosovo**

Treaty on the Prevention of Genocide

International Refugee Convention

Shashi Tharoor, “Should UN Peacekeeping Go Back to Basics?” *Survival* 37-4 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 52-64.

Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo," *Survival*, (Autumn 1999), pp. 102-123.

Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo, Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," *International Security*, (Spring 2000), pp. 39-84.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen and CJSC Hugh Shelton, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," October 14, 1999

Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters* (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29.

Kelly M. Greenhill, "Mission Impossible?: Preventing Deadly Conflict in the African Great Lakes Region," *Security Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (autumn 2001), pp. 77-124.

Recommended:

Visit the website set up by the *Philadelphia Inquirer* based on a series of stories by Mark Bowden about the US military intervention in Somalia in 1993

<http://www.blackhawkdown.com>. Read the book, available in paperback, Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999) or see the movie.

For non-Kosovo missions, see:

Bjoern Seibert, "African Adventure? Assessing the European Union's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic," MIT SSP Working Paper, November 2007.

Alan Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000.

Week 14, May 5 – The Nuclear Age, Nuclear Proliferation, and the Global War on Terror

Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons," Chapter 22, pp. 357-371, from Art and Waltz, *The Use of Force*, fifth edition, 1999.

Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994).

Barry R. Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear Armed World" *Security Studies*, vol. 6, No. 3 (spring 1997), pp. 1-31.

Barry Posen, "A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy Problem," 2006.

Daryl Press and Kier Lieber, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006.

Peter C.W. Flory, Keith Payne, Pavel Podvig, Alexei Arbatov, Keir Liever, Daryl Press, “Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2006.

Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126

“Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding the ‘Greatest Possible Danger’,” *Strategic Survey 2004/5* (Routledge: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005) pp. 37-50.

Review: Raas/Long article from week 5.

Week 15, May 12 – Review Session

Suggested Paper Topics
(If you do not like these, suggest another!)

The following list of topics was devised to develop your ability to analyze non-nuclear military competitions. Not all of these topics narrowly concern US military forces, but they all bear on future US military planning.

WARNING: These are complex tasks of research and analysis. If you do not know much about Dewey and Hayden Libraries, now is the time to learn.

You should discuss your paper topic with your TA in the early part of the term. A short proposal of a potential paper topic (or topics if you are deciding between a few) will be due in class on February 26. A preliminary outline and research plan will be due in class on March 11. A more comprehensive outline will be due in class on April 8. The final paper will be due in class on May 6.

Potential US contingencies:

Assess the air and ground campaigns that would attend a clash of arms on the Korean Peninsula. What might be the military objectives of each side? Could they achieve them? How might the fighting be terminated? Caution: Several analyses of a straightforward N. Korean attack on S. Korea have been published. One is in the syllabus. Please do not replicate these analyses. Look for a piece of the puzzle that has received insufficient attention, in your judgment.

One of the arguments made to justify a lengthy US presence in Iraq is the threat of all-out domestic and potentially regional conflict between Sunni, Shi'ites and Kurds for control of Iraqi territory. Assess what this conflict might look like. What would an all-out fight between Iraq's domestic factions look like? What capabilities can they bring to the table and what are likely targets? Alternatively, suppose Saudi Arabia, Iran, and/or other states entered the fight to help domestic allies: what might be the military objectives of each side? What forces could each side field? Could they achieve their objectives?

The conventional wisdom among American defense experts is that China does not have sufficient military capability to conquer Taiwan. Is the conventional wisdom well founded? If so, is Taiwan's present security vis-a-vis China likely to erode in the foreseeable future? Alternatively, what are the current and future threats to Taiwan from a Chinese military blockade, or from a Chinese campaign of harassment, based on persistent conventional ballistic missile attacks?

Suppose NATO had been forced to wage a ground campaign to take Kosovo from the Serbs in 1999. What might that campaign have looked like? What kinds of forces would NATO have needed to assure a reasonable probability of success. What might it have cost in terms of NATO, Serb, and Kosovar Albanian lives. What might have been the fate of the infrastructure of Kosovo during such a battle? You may assume, for purposes of analysis, that the Serbs were willing to fight, but you may constrain them to the forces now known to have been present in Kosovo and immediately across the border in Serbia.

Prior to the 2003 U.S. led war with Iraq, military planners and independent analysts worried about the possibility that Saddam Hussein would organize a last ditch defense in

Baghdad, a major urban battle. Some analysts were optimistic about the course of such a battle and some were very pessimistic. In the actual event, it appears that Saddam did not make a major effort to fight in Baghdad. Suppose he had. How do you think the battle would have gone? What explains the disagreements among the pre-war analysts?

During the final days of the first phase of the Afghan War, it seems that Osama Bin Laden and many Al Qaida fighters were cornered near the Pakistan border, at a place called Tora Bora. Many appear to have escaped. How did this occur. What might the U.S. military reasonably have done to try to prevent this escape. What risks would have been assumed in the effort. Would it have been worth it? Why or Why not?

In the Middle-East/Persian Gulf Region several possible new campaigns in the Bush Administration’s “War on Terror” seem possible. These include military action of one kind or another vs Iran, Syria, or Lebanon. Assess the nature, difficulty, and resource requirements of a U.S. military campaign vs. one of these countries.

The U.S. Navy has, since the early 1990’s become concerned with “littoral warfare”—naval combat close to adversary shores. The Pentagon is concerned about “access denial”—the possibility that other states could prevent U.S. military power from getting ashore in key areas of the world. Examine carefully the present and emerging littoral warfare capabilities of a medium sized country of interest to the U.S. in a key area of the world. This could be N. Korea or Iran. Estimate their ability to contest the ability of the U.S. to project power into local waters and across the shore.

The Bush administration (like the Clinton Administration before it), has been very concerned about North Korea’s apparent nuclear weapons program. Both have tried diplomatic solutions to induce that country to dismantle the program. Suppose the current round of diplomacy fails. Assess the question of whether or not a limited military strike can be devised that would eliminate North Korea’s ability to produce new nuclear weapons. Be sure to discuss your level of confidence in the plan’s effectiveness. (You could examine Iran if you wished.) You could also conduct this analysis from the perspective of another country. For example you might put yourself in the position of an Indian or Pakistani military planner trying to develop and assess the feasibility of such a campaign versus one another.

The U.S. faces an insurgency of some kind in Iraq today. Assess the current conflict. In light of what you can discover about counter-insurgency strategy and tactics, the insurgents, U.S. capabilities, and U.S. policies, what is your projection for Iraq over the next two-three years? Do you believe current U.S. policies are likely to produce an outcome that looks like a “success.” If so, why? If not, why not?

Suppose that either internal political developments, or external action, were to produce a collapse of the governments of Iran or Pakistan. The argument would surely be advanced that someone has to introduce military forces into these countries to reestablish stability. Assess the requirements of military operations devised to bring about political stability in either country.

Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state. It is also a politically unstable country. Suppose that a rapid political change in that country produces fears in the U.S. that its nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands. Assess the military problem of destroying, or securing those weapons.

The US is changing its strategy in Afghanistan as the insurgency there grows in force and fervor. Analyze the possible evolution of a new US strategy given the lessons – positive and negative – of past COIN operations. What are likely military objectives in this campaign? What can and will the US need to do to achieve these goals? Alternately, in light of what you can discover about counter-insurgency strategy and tactics, the insurgents, U.S. capabilities, and U.S. policies, what is your projection for Afghanistan over the next two-three years? Do you believe current U.S. policies are likely to produce an outcome that looks like a “success.” If so, why? If not, why not?

Non-US Contingencies:

Evaluate the military balance in South Asia (India and Pakistan). What conventional military pressures, if any, are fueling the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent? Could conventional arms control ease these pressures?

The recent Mumbai attacks in India have led to a dramatic increase in Indian-Pakistani tensions. Assuming Pakistan refuses to accede to Indian demands to turn over militants implicated in the attacks, what could India do to resolve outstanding issues resulting from the attacks via the use of force?

Pakistan is also now engaged in a fight against the Taliban and tribal supporters in the Northwest Frontier in which the Pakistani Army has taken heavy casualties. Evaluate the nature of this fight. Could Pakistan do more to suppress these non-state actors and, if so, what? What evidence is there that Pakistan lacks the political will, rather than the military capacity, to suppress internal opposition as some scholars have argued?

Review Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO operation against Serbia prompted by the civil war in Kosovo. Many government officials on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested that the operation demonstrates the woeful backwardness of European military forces. What evidence is there to support this proposition. How backward do the Europeans seem to be. In what areas. Do current European defense programs hold much promise of remedying the inadequacies? When?

Examine possible humanitarian interventions by the European Union in the Republic of the Congo, Darfur in Sudan, or Zimbabwe,. What are the dimensions of the problem? What might be the objectives of the intervention? What kinds of capabilities would be necessary? Do the Europeans have the necessary capabilities?

Review the 2008 Georgia-Russian War. What were Russian and Georgian objectives in the conflict? Could the Georgians have defeated Russian forces and, if so, how? If Georgia joins NATO – as some policymakers advocate - what would NATO be able to contribute to a renewed Georgian-Russian conflict?

Israel invaded Lebanon during the summer of 2006 in an effort to root out Hizbollah forces. Anticipating an easy victory, they soon found themselves embroiled in a costly campaign. Since then, Israel has nominally endeavored to learn from its mistakes to better prepare its forces if and when a similar fight erupts in the future. Consider one of the following:

- Assess the nature of Israel’s shortcomings in 2006. Could Israel, with the forces and resources then at its disposal, have done a better job in attacking Hizbollah?
- What might a future campaign look like from the point of view of either 1) Israeli, or 2) Hizbollah strategy?

Asian countries seem to fear the military potential of Japan. Assess Japanese military capabilities today. Do not merely enumerate holdings of weapons systems. Pick a notional campaign in Asia, and assess Japan's independent capability in that campaign. Note, the following examples are not chosen for their likelihood, but for their analytic utility. Examples:

- A Japanese effort to blockade China's seaborne trade.
- A Japanese effort to defend itself, by itself, from a dedicated Chinese submarine campaign against Japanese merchant shipping
- Japan's vulnerability to a dedicated Chinese conventional ballistic missile attack. (Note: This analysis would involve first an assessment of China's plausible conventional missile capability, and then an assessment of the inherent vulnerability of Japan's economic infrastructure, its civil defense capability, and accounting for its nascent anti-ballistic missile defenses).
- Japanese participation alongside the U.S. in a war with the China over Taiwan