Caspar Hare
I write about ethics, and about metaphysics, and about connections between them.
Work on the Metaphysics of Self and Time
On Myself, And Other, Less Important Subjects
Princeton University Press, September 2009
My book about the metaphysics of the self, ethical egoism and identity through time.
'Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time'
Journal of Philosophy CIV, no. 7, July 2007
This paper turned into the first section of the book.
'Realism About Tense and Perspective'
This paper may serve as an introduction to some of the ideas in the book.
Work on Practical Rationality and Normative Ethics
'Rationality and the Distant Needy'
Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 2, Spring 2007
This is my argument for the claim that morality and rationality, together, are very demanding indeed. It is much harder than you think to be morally decent and rational.
'Voices From Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?'
Ethics 117, no. 3, April 2007
This is about the rights and wrongs of bringing people into existence. In a nutshell: sometimes what matters is not what would have happened to you, but what would have happened to the person who would have been in your position, even if that person never actually exists.
'A Puzzle About Other-Directed Time Bias'
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 2, June 2008
I want my pains to be behind me and my pleasures ahead of me. Should I want the same for other people? Yes, in spite of prevalent intuitions to the contrary.
'The Ethics of Morphing'
Philosophical Studies 145, no. 1, July 2009
This is about inter-personal aggregation -- trading off costs and benefits when the people who suffer the costs are not the same as the people who reap the benefits. Loosely the idea is that, because the space of all metaphysically possible states of affairs is exceedingly rich in detail, and because identity across possible states of affairs is a slippery thing, pure benevolence (wanting things to be better for particular people) commits us to aggregating inter-personally.
'Perfectly Balanced Interests'
Philosophical Perspectives, forthcoming
This, too, is about cases in which people's interests conflict. I argue that how we think about some important such cases depends on how we think about a very general problem about you ought to behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you lack preferences between items, and still lack preferences if one item is mildly improved). I discuss the significance of this problem for decision theory in 'Take the Sugar', below.
'Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would have Happened If You Had Not Done What You Did'
Noûs, forthcoming
This is about conditional under-specification and the objective ought. Moral: sometimes there is a difference between what there is most reason for you to do and what a fully informed, benevolent observer would want you to do.
'Take the Sugar'
Analysis, forthcoming
I raise a problem about you ought to behave, when you have sweetening-insensitive negative preferences (when you lack preferences between items, and still lack preferences if one item is mildy improved). For decision theorists, this problem gives rise to a fork in the road. I present two ways to extend standard decision theory so as to accomodate two different solutions to the problem.
Book in Progress
I am working on another book. Its aim is to derive a substantial theory of normative ethics from some very spare, uncontroversial assumptions about rationality, benevolence and essence.